Ignacy S. Fiut
AGH University of Science and Technology, al. Adama Mickiewicza 30, 30–059 Cracow, Poland.
E-mail: email@example.com; firstname.lastname@example.org
IS THE “FOURTH WORLD” POSSIBLE IN KARL R. POPPER’S EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY MODEL?
The work analyses the concept of three worlds formulated by Karl R. Popper. His arguments make it possible to distinguish in this field of research the fourth world— that of the development and application of human knowledge. The criteria of Popper's division are accepted and some doubts concerning his conception are dispelled by the arguments of researchers dealing with the evolution and development of traditional, electronic and Internet media. Those arguments point the need of the concept of fourth world. The author discusses the views of technological determinants in communication authored by M. McLuhan, D. De Kerckhove, P. Levinson, H. Jenkins and J. Pleszczyński who provide reasonable arguments for this new classification. The Popper’s model of three worlds is thus enriched by the fourth world—the world created by users of old and new media, the internet, and multimedia in communication. It is a real world, rooted in the three other worlds.
Keywords: Karl R. Popper’s three words, fourth world, new media of communication, M. McLuhan, D. De Kerckhove, P. Levinson, H. Jenkins and J. Pleszczyński.
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail : email@example.com
JÜRGEN MITTELSTRASS: THE HUMANITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITY OF SCIENCE CONCEPTION
The author recounts the main threads of Jürgen Mittelstrass’s philosophy of the humanities. In it, the German philosopher starts out with the critique of J. Ritter’s and O. Maquard’s so-called functionalistic and dualistic conception of the human sciences, stating preference for methodological monism, which sees all sciences united by the universal rules of rationality. Mittelstrass seeks this unity both in the trans-disciplinary trends in contemporary science, as well as in certain epistemological similarities and similarities in research praxis between scientific disciplines. The author also points to Mittelstrass’s Kantian inspirations, and his clever adaptation of the “power of judgement” concept for the purposes of his own argumentation. In a final resume, he passes a generally positive opinion about the discussed conception with some critical comments.
Keywords: The humanities/the human sciences, rationality, the compensatory functions of the humanities, power of judgement, trans-disciplinary, research praxis.
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland.
HOW IS SCIENCE UNIVERSAL?
I examine the problem of universalities of science and the thesis on the antiuniversality of science commonly postulated in socialized conceptions of science. In the paper epistemic universality, ethical-axiological and global cultural-social universality, and in the latter—global universality of the basic level are distinguished. It is investigated why in epistemology science is necessarily viewed as universal in its basic aspects. It is shown that universality is a necessary effect of validity and autonomy of science. It is also demonstrated that multiculturalism improperly treats science as necessarily anti-universalistic. I propose the position of global universalism of the basic level which claims that science emerges from the cultural basis, common for all the cultures. This universalism adopts multiculturalism (cultural pluralism) on higher levels of culture. I also consider how epistemic and global universality—features of science—become its values, and what are their significance for the human world.
Keywords: epistemology, socialized conceptions of science, the universality of science, epistemic universality, global social-cultural universality, universality as a value.
Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland.
E-mail: marek firstname.lastname@example.org
ANALOGIES REFERRING TO INFORMATION SCIENCE AND BIOLOGY IN EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE
The level of adequacy of an analogy determines its effectiveness in scientific explanation. This thesis is examined in the context of analogies to information science and biology used in the concept of cultural meme, which is supposed to be substantial in explaining science or culture in the terms of evolution. It is shown that the choice of the cultural equivalent of biological specimen is crucial to interpreting the evolution of culture as that of the Lamarckian or Darwinian type.
Keywords: evolution, culture, analogy, meme.
Husserl-Archiv der Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, D-50923 Köln, Niemcy.
PHENOMENOLOGY AS A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE AND SOME CHALLENGES OF THE TODAY HUMANITIES—NEW PERSPECTIVES IN HUMAN STUDIES
Phenomenology is a philosophical project with vast potential, mainly methodological one, which has been not exploited in full until now. It is not limited to 20thcentury hermeneutics based on Heidegger’s views, nor to analytically founded contemporary investigations on language. Today this potential is revealed when the humanities and social studies face new challenges requiring new interpretations of human experience. Here transcendental phenomenology—as a theory of experience from the living perspective based on the intentional-genetic method—offers new research possibilities.
Keywords: transcendental phenomenology, intentional experience, experiential living perspective, motivation, developmental process.
Institute of Philosophy, Nicholas Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 1 a, 87-100 Toruń, Poland.
WAS ARNOLD GEHLEN A NATURALISTIC REDUCTIONIST?
The article takes up a polemic with an accusation of naturalist reductionism, which allegedly constitutes the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Gehlen. In the first section of the article I will analyze the legitimacy of the charge of reductionism in the context of Gehlen’s considerations on human nature, in turn the subjcekt of the second part will be the concept of nature as an objective world, while the third and fourth sections will deal with issues concerning morality (3) and culture and human consciousness (4) in view of the allegation of the naturalism of his anthropological project. The author argues that Gehlen’s anthropology is aimed at integrating the results of the biological and social sciences, but he derives philosophical implications from them on such a level of generality that they go beyond the competence of specific sciences. Their findings acquire a universal meaning in his concept within the framework of a system of philosophical categories describing man as a whole project of nature. Gehlen rejects all attempts to create a general human theory on the basis of comparative studies that derive the property of the human condition from the animal world. Gehlen’s anthropobiology resigns from the concept of man’s nature in the biological sense, i.e. as a set of evolutionarily determined morphological, physiological and behavioral features, he also abandons the objectiveist concept of “external nature” as an ontical area independent of cultural mediation. Language, consciousness and culture are the result of processes compensating for biological deficits, and at the same time they represent the area of competence and values that are autonomous and autotelic, and therefore completely independent of biological conditions.
Keywords: Arnold Gehlen, naturalistic reductionism, philosophical anthropology, culture, language, morality, institutions.
Pedagogical University of Krakow , Podchorążych 2, 30-084 Cracow, Poland.
A VIEW ON HUMAN HERMENEUTIC CAPABILITIES FROM THE ZOOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The article attempts to present the philosophical idea of origin of human capability to interpret and understand meanings. I am inspired by the results of contemporary cognitive and natural sciences as well as psychology. In view of those sciences one can defy hermeneutical concepts, which are embedded in the modern anthropocentric tradition. I would like to explain the ontological status of so-called hermeneutical skills in a naturalized form that does not avoid the continuous gradation of subject’s structures or abilities without falling into trivial reductionism. I demonstrate that the comprehensive formation of understanding processes is reserved for particular groups of human beings. However, it can be justified that different animal species and direct human ancestors are equipped with some elements of hermeneutical skills. These skills are a ground of the notion of Dasein. This paper begins my reflection on the natural history of human understanding and on polemics with anthropocentric philosophical hermeneutics. The basic aim of this work is to closely consider the hypothesis which states that the fundamental aspect of human existence (primordial modes) such as comprehension, attuning towards meanings or being-in-the-world can be grasped as natural adaptations of human and non-human organisms.
Keywords: hermeneutics, understanding, interpretation, evolution, sense, symbol.
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism, University of Gdansk, Jana Bażyńskiego 8, 80-309 Gdansk, Poland.
IS THERE A CHANGE IN THE CRITERIA OF BEING A SCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS?
The contemporary physical and cosmological theories confront philosophers and methodologists with a problem of scientific character of the considered ideas. It is mainly connected with the issue of their empirical testing. We know that many conceptions of contemporary physics, such as the conceptions of superstrings or of multiverse, have not been confirmed by even a single observation or experiment. In this situation there appear attempts to “weaken” methodological requirements imposed on theories to consider them as scientific after all. The challenge that physicists, philosophers and methodologists face is to attempt to define a feasible, possible to perform, non-empirical verification procedure in the case when these theories postulate the existence of basically non-observable areas of reality.
Keywords: testability; falsifiability; demarcation criteria; Popper; Bayesian methods; non-empirical theory confirmation.
Adam Krawiec, Marek Szydłowski, Paweł Tambor
Institute of Economics, Finance and Management of the Jagiellonian University, ul. Łojasiewicza 4, 30–348 Kraków.
Astronomical Observatory of the Jagiellonian University, ul. Orla 171, 30–244 Cracow, Poland.
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.
THE ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL SPECIFICITY OF COSMOLOGY AS A SCIENCE ON THE UNIVERSE
We discuss the specificity of modern cosmology understood as the physics of the Universe. We can treat cosmology as specific because of its object, i.e. the physical Universe is specific, as well as the ways of acquiring the knowledge about the Universe are specific. We argue that the specific and, in some sense, unique methodological nature of modern cosmology compared to physics is not controversial, as it is claimed among others by Helge Kragh. In our view this specificity is natural of cosmology itself and has its foundations in: 1) the asymmetry of prediction (which favors retrognosis), 2) the temporal nature of observations applied in cosmological investigations, 3) the horizon problem and the relevance of initial conditions for cosmological evolution.
Keywords: modern cosmology, philosophy of science, methodological specificity of cosmology, the evolution of the Universe.
Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Cracow, Poland.
ON NICHOLAS RESCHER’S ORIENTATIONAL PLURALISM IN METAPHILOSOPHY
The article discusses Nicholas Rescher’s metaphilosophical view of orientational pluralism. In his essay Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy Rescher explains a substantial difference between philosophy and science—namely, that philosophers—differently than scientists— continuously propose and undermine various solutions to the same old problems. In philosophy it is difficult to find any consensus or convergence of theories. According to Rescher, this pluralism of theoretical positions is caused by holding by philosophers different sets and hierarchies of cognitive values, i.e. methodological orientations. These orientations are chosen in virtue of some practical postulates, they are of axiological, normative, but not strictly theoretical character. Different methodological orientations yield different evaluations of philosophical theses and arguments. This article shows that Rescher’s account does not determine clearly acceptable cognitive values. If there are no clear criteria of evaluation of methodological orientations, then the described view seems to be identical to relativism adopting the everything goes rule. In addition, accepting orientational pluralism it is hard to avoid the conclusion that discussions between various philosophical schools are futile or can be reduced to non-rational persuasion.
Keywords: metaphilosophy, Nicholas Rescher, relativism, methodology of philosophy, orientational pluralism.
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warsaw, Poland.
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND ON THE BASIS OF STANISŁAW LEM’S DIALOGUES
The aim of this article is to present Lem’s philosophy of mind. The author bases it on Dialogues — the first Lem’s philosophical essays published in 1957. It is emphasized that at that time Lem was influenced by cybernetics. I present connections between cybernetics and Lem's theory. He considered such issues as: consciousness, machine consciousness, personal identity. What is more, he investigated if immortality was available to human. I reconstruct his conception of mind and its anthropological and ontological consequences.
Keywords: Lem, philosophy of mind, mind uploading, cybernetics, personal identity, consciousness.
Andrzej Bronk, Monika Walczak
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Aleje Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Aleje Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland.
STANISŁAW KAMIŃSKI’S METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS
Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. His all academic carrier was pursuing at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL). The main interests of Kamiński was the history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. He himself saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics. He gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology). He investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, the modern history of the theory of definition, theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, deductive method, the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was a maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge, distinguished and investigated material and formal parts of knowledge. He also distinguished—besides commonsense knowledge—the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge, nonreducible each to other. At the top he set sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. Kamiński derived his understanding of science from contemporary as well as classical philosophy. He determined the nature of science from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science was for him a philosophical question, presupposing an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world, subjective states of man and products of his mind and language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Kamiński assumes here pluralism: different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. He also accepts an antinaturalistic position in the humanities which he regards as methodologically autonomous in regard to natural sciences. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life three books have been published: Georgonne'a teoria definicji [Georgonne's Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and (together with M. A. Krąpiec) Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd – Religia – Teologia [Worldview – Religion – Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998.
Keywords: definition of science, classification of sciences, ethics of science, humanities and natural sciences, methodology, philosophy, philosophy of science, rationality of science, science, scientific method, Stanisław Kamiński, theology, theory of science.
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, ul. Obitza 1, 10-725 Olsztyn, Poland.
THE DISPUTE ON THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF PHILOSOPHY. ON ZDZISŁAW CACKOWSKI’S DISCUSSION WITH PHENEMENOLOGY
In the article I analytically reconstruct Zdzisław Cackowski’s basic ways of the understanding character of philosophy and science. I emphasize that according to Cackowski philosophy is a science (a nomothetic one) but simultaneously it is the most general science. Philosophy, like other sciences, satisfies conditions and criteria of being science. Besides its cognitive function, philosophy, like other sciences, plays practical functions; especially it is a basis of worldviews and ideologies. According to Cackowski, the specific character of philosophy arises from its universalistic aspirations and consists in a very high level of generality of discovered principles; those principles refer to the objective reality and knowledge on it. The specificity of philosophy also consists in—according to Cackowski—revealing the nature of qualitative jumps between basic segments of the real world, e.g. between quantum objects and macroscopic ones, between non-organic and organic nature; between neuronal processes and mind process etc. However, tending to not break the link between philosophy and reality, Cackowski grounds philosophical synthesis in scientific discoveries, results, and scientific praxis. Cackowski’s way of understanding of philosophy is, on the one hand, close to positivistic, scientific and Marxist concepts of philosophy, and on the other hand, it is opposite to the phenomenological concept of philosophy. Cackowski’s reservations and objections to the phenomenological project of philosophical investigations appear continuously in his works (they change only slightly in the course of time), and they refer to: (1) the scope and the meaning of the autonomy of sciences, (2) the rule of assumptionless standpoint (regardless of the level of its radicalism), (3) Husserl’s “rule of the all rules” as a basic methodological principle, (4) the phenomenological concept of direct experience, (5) the possibility and the range of eidetic knowledge, (6) the idea of transcendentalism and the concept of pure consciousness, (7) the essential fundamental position, motivated by Descartes’s ideas and irrational longing to discover the metaphysical and epistemological absolute.
Keywords: philosophy, science, phenomenology, Marxist philosophy, epistemology, reality, action, acquisition, knowledge, empiricism, inductionism, positivism, scientism, praxism, assumptionlessness (Voraussetzungslosigkeit, Vorurteilslosigkeit), the rule of assumptionlessness (das Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit), transcendentalism, eidetism, direct experience.
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland.
STEFAN AMSTERDAMSKI’S CONCEPTION OF IDEAL OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT OF SCIENCE
The conception of ideals of science was Stefan Amsterdamski’s contribution to the dispute about scientific rationality. In assuming that scientific method is not an ahistorical phenomenon, and comes with rather strong normative pressupositions, Amsterdamski sides with Thomas Kuhn in his debate with Karl Popper and the latter’s followers and supporters. Essentially, however, Amsterdamski is a Popperian; he is intent on enlarging the scope of critical analysis by applying it to what he calls the modern ideal of science. His works, especially the monograph Pomiędzy historią a metodą [Between History and Method] are an attempt to safeguard the status of philosophy of science a normative instance with respect to ideals of science. In the paper I offer a reconstruction of Amsterdamski’s conception as well as scrutinize the relationship between his expressed philosophic goals and methods he employed in order to attain these goals. I indicate what I find most problematic in the concept of ideal of science and suggest an alternative view on the problems as raised by Amsterdamski. I argue that Amsterdamski’s work warrants an attempt at the formulation of a new conception of subject of science which would provide guidelines for a proper critique of modern science.
Keywords: ideals of science, scientific rationality, history of science, Stefan Amsterdamski, subject of science.
Institute of Philosophy, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, Poland.
FLORIAN ZNANIECKI ON SCIENCE. THE ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
I include Florian Znaniecki’s understanding of cultural sciences into a wider philosophical project which I call social onto-epistemology. The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct Znaniecki’s philosophy as a research effort to set the foundation of social sciences; the “foundation” is meant here as it is meant in 19th philosophical fundamentalism, i.e. as the search for the basis of legitimisation of social sciences. Despite of the non-originality of this aim, the measures and modes of its application in Znaniecki’s approach were fruitful. The onto-epistemological approach avoids Cartesian and Kantian dualisms and, pre-eminently, the monosubjective understanding of the cognitive subject. The graduation of realness with regard to the object of social science, objectivity as belonging to many systems of cultural objects are main invention on this path. The main onto-epistemological premise of Znaniecki’s strategy is as follows: Human knowledge is deeply rooted in human social existence, and the human mode of existence, in turn, contains necessarily and essentially an epistemic component.
Keywords: Znaniecki, onto-epistemology, science, social sciences.
The Maria Grzegorzewska Academy of Special Education, Szczęśliwicka 40, 02-353 Warszawa, Poland.
THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE SAGE. ON FLORIAN ZNANIECKI’S CONCEPTION
The article concerns Florian Znaniecki’s problem of social role of the sage. The first part of the article presents the concept of social role of the sage in the context of other social roles of scholars. In the second part, Znaniecki’s view is confronted with the contemporary social and scientific realities.
Keywords: Florian Znaniecki, sage, wisdom, social role of the man of knowledge.
Graduate School for Social Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland.
ARNOLD GEHLEN’S MAN, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOME QUESTIONS ASKED DBY CONTEMPORARY READERS
I examine the key elements of Arnold Gehlen’s concept of human being as it is presented in his book Man, His Nature and Place in the World. I analyze his attempt to interpret the human as a whole and to define humanity as a species which is “lacking” and whose acts must compensate for its “primitive” traits. I briefly present selected questions and difficulties that might be posed by the contemporary reader upon learning about Gehlen’s understanding of the human being and his vision of philosophical anthropology, its aims and methodology.
Keywords: Arnold Gehlen, philosophical anthropology, German philosophy, human nature.
Institute of Sociology, University of Wroclaw, Koszarowa 3, 52–007 Wrocław, Poland.
SCIENCE AND ITS CRITIQUE: THE CONTEXT OF ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
The article starts with the considerations presented by Małgorzata Czarnocka in her paper O krytyce nauki [On a Critique of Science] (Czarnocka 2017) in order to consider the critical potential of dualism—the ideal of science—practice of science. These considerations are compared with the Actor-Network Theory, which, on the one hand, in its theses about science approaches to the image criticized by Czarnocka, but, on the other hand, retains a similar critical potential. This is despite the fact that ANT this theory programmatically rejects the duality ideal–praxis. Presented considerations focus on designating common points and differences between the dualistic and non-dualistic approaches in the context of Czarnocka’s article.
Keywords: dualism, non-dualism, criticism of science, Latour, Actor-Network Theory.