3/2015

Giorgio Derossi

Affiliation: Universita degli Studi di Trieste, Piazzale Europa, 1, 34128 Trieste TS,  Italy

E-mail: serenacattaruzza@alice.it

 

THE PERCEPTUAL DIMENSION IN EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND IN SCIENCE

 

ABSTRACT

The author presents a possible important contribution of experimental phenomenology to the methodology of scientific research. Experimental phenomenology is a phenomenological approach developed recently from some epistemological implications of the inspired by the Gestalt theory investigations concerning perception. The paper is especially concentrated on investigations performed by the group which was being active at the Trieste University in the second half of the 20th century; the group was leading by Gaetano Kanizsa, a perception specialist. The here mentioned implications refer to the possibility of forming spatiotemporal conditions, which reveal reality beyond phenomena and which in the classical Husserl  phenomenology approach are recognized to be knowable only ideally. The author contests the idealistic mortgage of the classical phenomenology, and emphasizes the essentiality of some arguments which seems to legitimize the mentioned possibility of a new realism. The author quotes creative visualizations applying relevant Gedankenexperimenten, elaborated by Ernst Mach in his historical-critical researches of the evolution of modern mechanics. However, the author first of all presents the essential features of the visualization of the absolute reality of the space perceived in the phenomenon of incongruent correspondents, stated in last pre-critical Kant’s essay. Thus the theoretical-historical perspective is outlined in which a more essential role can be played by—together with the vision of ideal essences— the very vision of reality.

Keywords: perception, idealization, visualization, mental experiment, continuity-non-continuity, incongruent correspondents, reality. 

 

 

 

Stanisław Czerniak

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: stanislaw.czerniak@outlook.com

 

ARNOLD GEHLEN’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AS A MODEL OF SOCIETY CRITIQUE

 

ABSTRACT

The author distinguishes three notions of philosophical anthropology and at the same time three developmental streams of this domain. He considers the relations linking philosophical anthropology with critical social philosophy. Next, he explicates the main assumptions of Arnold Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, and searches for an answer to the following question: how those assumptions influence the categorical specificity of Gehlen’s critique of the postmodern society embraced in the notion of contemporary institutions crisis.  The author elaborates those analyses by referring to Gehlen’s work Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter and to the carried out there analyses of the so called new subjectivism. The article is concluded by critical investigations on some ideational inconsistencies of Gehlen’s philosophical position.

Keywords: philosophy of man, philosophical anthropology, flood of stimuli, instinct overcapacity, language, social institutions, action, new subjectivism.

 

 

 

Rafał Michalski
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Nicholas Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 1 a, 87-100 Toruń, Poland

E-mail: metasis@umk.pl

 

THE GENESIS OF LANGUAGE IN AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE.

THE POSITION OF ARNOLD GEHLEN AND GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

 

ABSTRACT

The article reconstructs the main assumptions of Arnold Gehlen’s conception of the origin of language, supplementing its shortcomings with some conclusions drawn from George Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism. The first two sections contain the description of the ontogeny of linguistic competence, with special reference to “embodied meaning,” the notion describing the fact that human language is deeply rooted in motor imagination. Employing the term, Gehlen tries to prove that any notions, even the most abstract ones, are crystallized through sensorimotor schemas, i.e. through bodily characteristics that enable the man to interact with his environment. The language has therefore a relieving function, because it compensates the inherent lack of adaptation to specific environmental conditions and chronic surplus of drives that are not channeled. The third section analyses the philosopher’s arguments for the thesis that language and discursive thinking create an inseparable unity. The reconstruction of Gehlen’s theory is summarized by a critical commentary to some of its elements together with an overview of several topics of Mead’s social behaviorism which can be seen as its corroboration and development.

Keywords: origin of language, social behaviorism, ontogeny, motor imagination, relief, communication.

 

 

 

Zdzisława Piątek

Affiliation: Jagiellonian University, ul. Gołębia 24, 31–007 Kraków, Poland 

E-mail: zdzislawa.piatek33@gmail.com

 

ON THE BANALITY OF GOOD UNDERSTOOD AS THE GOOD OF LIVING BEINGS

 

ABSTRACT

This paper is about the good of living beings. The concept is analogous to Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil in that it is unconscious (unknowing) since the non-human living beings are not driven in their actions by conscious motivation. The “motivation” of realization of the good of its own is genetic information. The good of their own of living beings i.e., the ability to live within the measure of one’s own species is related to the drive of self–preservation and is a fundamental value since it is the basis of all the other goods. Its realization requires the subjects of life, just like the realization of moral good requires moral subjects. The thesis of this paper is that moral subjects and moral goods derive from the subjects of life.

 

 

 

Małgorzata Czarnocka

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: mczarnoc@ifispan.waw.pl

 

SUBJECTIVITY IN NEO-KANTIANISM

 

ABSTRACT

The paper analyses Neo-Kantianism views on cognitive subjectivity: constructions by Heinrich Rickert (valuing subject and epistemological subject), by Bruno Bauch (proper subject – principium), by Hermann Cohen (a logical substitution linking rules of thinking, methods and cognitive procedures) and Paul Natorp’s exclusion of subjectivity. The Neo-Kantianism conceptions of subjectivity are determined by the Neo-Kantianism metatheses: anti-psychologism, objectivism, and epistemological fundamentalism. It is demonstrated that Neo-Kantianism elaborated a foundation to philosophize without the category of subject, and initiated the metaphilosophical transformation to the linguistic paradigm. The basis of this change holds that only the objective subject is able to acquire objective knowledge.

Keywords: Neo-Kantianism, cognitive subject, the paradigm of consciousness, linguistic paradigm.

 

 

 

Mariusz Mazurek
Affiliation: Lublin University of Technology Nadbystrzycka 38 D, 20-618 Lublin, Poland

E-mail: mariusz.mazurek@pollub.pl

 

SCIENTIFIC THEORETICAL MODELS

 

ABSTRACT

I analysed three most interesting and extensive approaches to theoretical models: classical ones—proposed by Peter Achinstein and Michael Redhead, and the relatively rare analysed approach of Ryszard Wójcicki, belonging to a later phase of his research where he gave up applying the conceptual apparatus of logical semantics. I took into consideration the approaches to theoretical models in which they are qualified as models representing the reality. That is why I omitted Max Black’s and Mary Hesse’s concepts of such models, as those two concepts belong to the analogue model group if we consider the main function of the model of a given class as its classification criterion. My main focus was on theoretical models with representative functions as these very models and, in a broader context, the question of representation. To consider these problems philosophy of science concentrates its main attention.

Keywords: representation, theory, models, Peter Achinstein, Michael Redhead, Ryszard Wójcicki

 

 

 

Mariusz Mazurek
Affiliation: Lublin University of Technology Nadbystrzycka 38 D, 20-618 Lublin, Poland

E-mail: mariusz.mazurek@pollub.pl

 

THE DEFLATIONARY CONCEPTION OF REPRESENTATION IN MAURIZIO SUÁREZ’S CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

 

ABSTRACT

I analysed Maurizio Suárez’s concept of representation due to the following reasons. Firstly the aforementioned concept declaratively (yet, as it turns out, only seemingly) breaks out of the mainstream, standard ways of approaching the relation of representation; those identify the representation with similarities of properties or with isomorphism. Secondly Suárez's investigations show how difficult is to disregard the standard presentation of the relation of representation based on commonsense intuitions, related to the naive epistemological realism and even being a version of such realism. Suárez's attempt indicates that the problem of representation, so broadly discussed nowadays, probably requires (in order to achieve new solutions) the introduction of an entirely new conceptual apparatus and thus approaching the problem of representation from an entirely new perspective.
Keywords: representation, deflationary conception, Maurizio Suárez.

 

 

 

Andrzej Gecow
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: gecow@op.pl

 

A WAY TO THE MODEL OF STRUCTURE EVOLUTION

 

ABSTRACT

Three simple models are presented which describe preliminarily basic observations of living objects. The first one is a model of the improving process of object without structure. It prepares intuition on evolution from the perspective of information and purposeful information, entropy and probability. The evolving object is described as a vector of properties of several equally probable variants. This model gives a formal foundation of small change tendency, and the quantitative basis for a natural identity criterion which has a deep philosophical meaning. Further it becomes a part of a model with a structure which indicates target structural tendencies. The second model describes the record length of purposeful information by use of which we intuitively distinguish living objects from the inanimate world. Here the model without structure is applied to the same object again but to its other aspect. The third model develops the notion “degeneration” defined in the model without structure. The paper discusses the reservation and scope of permitted degeneration during the quantitative explosion of adaptive radiation and during competition.
Keywords: biological information, purposeful information, degeneration, competition, quantitative explosion, adaptive radiation.

 

 

 

Radosław Sojak
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Nicholas Copernicus University, Fosa Staromiejska 1 a, 87-100 Toruń, Poland

E-mail: kedar@umk.pl

 

LET HER FLY HIGH. ON A DIVIDE BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE

 

ABSTRACT

Sociology has not dominated social studies of science (SSN). The latter develops itself largely autonomously and independently of sociology. The article sketches possible reasons of that situation. Apart from historical and institutional causes it points out three main reasons of a theoretical nature. (1) The relative absence of the Mertonian tradition within SSN; (2) a general distrust within SSN towards the explanation based on interests, and (3) actor-network theory's critique of sociological tradition. It is claimed that the critique is misguided and underestimates both the cognitive and practical potential of sociology.
Keywords: sociology; sociology of scientific knowledge; social studies of science; actor-network theory

 

 

 

Anna Michalska
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: michalskanna@gmail.com

 

SCIENCE AND RATIONALITY IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

 

ABSTRACT

The “classical” philosophy of science, basic tenets of which have been subjected to severe criticism over the years, conceives of science as the medium and the touchstone of rationality. Based on this assumption, the theory of science is the theory of rationality. Habermas’ theory of communicative action offers an interesting switch to this classical perspective. In his account, the notion of rationality is wider than that of science: rationality is irreducible to science constituting only one of three pillars of rationality. It also means that science cannot be reduced to an instrumental form of rationality.

This account of the relationship between science and rationality sheds a light on the most frequently formulated critical argument against Habermas’ theory, according to which the idea of communicative action is unrealistic. In my reply to that I argue that the theory of communicative action determine a set of empirical conditions that must be met for a communicative action to be possible. These conditions are demanding, but hardly unrealistic.
Keywords: science, rationality, theory of communicative action, empirical conditions of communicative action, transcendental conditions of communicative action.

 

 

 

Paweł Bytniewski

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, Poland 

E-mail: pbytniewski@tlen.pl

 

THREE MODELS OF THE DISCONTINUOUS PROCESS OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCES—BACHELARD, CANGUILHEM, FOUCAULT

 

ABSTRACT

The paper presents three models of the history of sciences, in which three different kinds of discontinuity of knowledge (epistemological, interdisciplinary, temporal) play the role of ordering the ways of understanding the historical process of sciences. Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault—the authors of these models—disposing of a historical material concerning natural sciences (Bachelard, Canguilhem) and the humanities (Foucault) attempt to settle the matter of the connection between the specificity of the historical process, in which those sciences are involved, and the epistemological qualifications of the knowledge being a product of this process. Each author, sharing with two others some initial, common assumptions, emphasizes differently, though, the role of the listed kinds of discontinuity in this process.

Keywords: history of sciences, discontinuity of knowledge, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault.

 

 

 

Zbysław Muszyński

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, Poland 

E-mail: zmuszyn@bacon.umcs.lublin.pl

 

EXTENDED MIND, EXTENDED COGNITION, “EXTENDED SCIENCE”

 

ABSTRACT

The paper analyses three categories mentioned in the title: extended mind, extended cognition, extended science, and to reveal their interconnections. All the categories refer to the conception of extended mind, whereas the notion of extended science is a proposal of applying the conception of extended mind to analysing the subject of scientific research, results of the research and the very process of establishing scientific knowledge, as well as understanding science and its functioning.

Keywords: extended mind, extended cognition, the principle of quotas, scientific knowledge, Andy Clark, David Chalmers, Ronald N. Giere, Richard Menary. 

 

 

 

Barbara Trybulec
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland

E-mail: barbara.trybulec@poczta.umcs.lublin.pl

 

PHEOMENOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE – TWO METHODS OF ANALYSIS OF THE COGNITIVE SUBJECT.

A PERSPECTIVE OF COLLABORATION AND ITS PROBLEMS

 

ABSTRACT

The paper presents benefits and difficulties carried by the project of incorporating the method of phenomenology into cognitive science. I explain the consequences of naturalizing phenomenology and analyse relations between the two lines of reflection on cognition – phenomenology and cognitive science. I also present some difficulties associated with neurophenomenology introduced by Francisco Varela. Neurophenomenology grows out from four philosophical traditions founded on different or even incompatible assumptions on  the cognitive subject. The main task for this discipline is to determine a consistent set of assumptions and methods which could constitute a theoretical ground composed of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. In the paper I argue that naturalizing phenomenology is an illusion. The only hope for a joined reflection on cognition lies in researches which combine the method of phenomenological reduction with the neuroscientific method of picturing the activity of the brain. Revealing neural correlates of the first-person experiences awakens hope for development of science about first-person perspective which is based neither on introspection nor on folk psychology, but on phenomenological reduction, and which together with cognitive science constitute the new value in the reflection on cognition. 
Keywords: epistemic subject, phenomenological reduction, cognitive science, neurophenomenology, consciousness, phenomenology.

 

 

 

Aleksandra Kołtun
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Marie Curie-Skłodowska University, Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland

E-mail: aleksandra.koltun@gmail.com

 

“EXTENDED SCIENCE” – AGORAS, LABORATORIES, SOCIAL MACHINES

 

ABSTRACT

The transformations in the functioning of contemporary science are recognised more and more often in the categories of extension of its areas of inquiry, heterogeneity of the engaged actors, and crossing the disciplinary boundaries. Along with these changes there arise questions concerning where and how exactly scientific knowledge emerges as well as the problem of defining the criteria of sciencehood. The article aims to present selected conceptions from the area of Science and Technology Studies; such ones which focus their attention to diverse spaces (of material, organisational and/or cultural kinds) in which supposedly scientific knowledge emerges. Altogether, it seems that these are both the organisational mode and the specific spaces that can currently serve as a basis for discerning science from non-science.
Keywords: “extended science”, Mode 2 knowledge production, agora, anthropology of science, laboratories, actor-network theory, social machines.

 

 

 

Małgorzata Koronkiewicz
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: malgorzata.koronkiewicz@gmail.com

 

CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE’S REALISM AND RICHARD RORTY’S ANTIREALISM

 

ABSTRACT

The paper analyses some elements of realism in Charles Sanders Peirce’s traditional pragmatism and of antirealism in Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Realism and antirealism are discussed here mainly in their relations to the problems of meaning, objectivity and truth.
Keywords: Charles Sanders Peirce, Richard Rorty, realism, antirealism, pragmatism, neopragmatism.

 

 

 

Marek Łagosz
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, University of Wroclaw, Koszarowa 3/20, 51-149 Wrocław, Poland

E-mail: lagosz@o2.pl

NATURAL HISTORY AND SOCIAL HISTORY. A COMPARATIVE ESSAY

 

ABSTRACT

In this paper I undertake the question of differences between natural and social history. I consider five detailed issues: the pace of qualitative changes and homogeneity of time, the arrow of time, the end of history, the totality of history, and the difference between historic nature and temporality.  I emphasize that the differences between natural and social history are not ontologically essential.
Keywords: natural history, social history, qualitative change, time, arrow of time, end of history, totality of history, historic nature, temporality.

 

 

 

Janusz Uchmański
Affiliation: Institute of Ecology and Bioethics, Department of Christian Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Wóycickiego 1/3, 01–938 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: j.uchmanski@uksw.edu.pl

 

MATHEMATICAL NATURE OF BIOLOGY

 

ABSTRACT

In natural sciences mathematics is used as a very useful language. Great achievements of physics are related to the application of mathematical methods. Physics has also great influence on the development of mathematics. The degree of the application of mathematics in biology is very small. Biology has no influence on mathematics. Mathematical methods used to describe physical systems are also used to describe biological systems. It can be a mistake. May be biology needs entirely new mathematical methods appropriate for describing the complexity of biological systems?
Keywords: mathematics, biology, mathematical nature of biology.

 

 

 

Anna Lemańska
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Wóycickiego 1/3, 01–938 Warszawa, Poland

E-mail: a.lemanska@uksw.edu.pl

EVOLUTION AS THE REALIZATION OF A PROJECT?

 

ABSTRACT

In scientific theories of biological evolution, evolution is presented as an undirected process in which chance plays an important role because the methods of the sciences are not able to detect any externally imposed order or project. This does not mean, however, that such a project does not exist. In this article I try to show that the philosophical interpretations of evolution allow for the possibility that evolution was the implementation of the project.
Keywords: evolution, purpose, chance, project.

 

 

 

Krzysztof Chodasewicz
Affiliation: Academy of Physiotherapy, Tadeusza Kościuszki 4, 50-038 Wrocław, Poland

E-mail: kchodasewicz@o2.pl

 

J.B.S. HALDANE AND FORMULATIONS OF CONDITIONS OF SELECTION

 

ABSTRACT

I analyze J.B.S. Haldane's view on defining necessary conditions for (evolution by) natural selection. This issue has been recently broadly discussed on the borderline between philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. I put forward a hypothesis that Haldane (like many population geneticists) did not try to formulate a summary of conditions of natural selection applicable to all cases of selection, but he built instead relevant differential mathematical models of natural selection.
Keywords: J.B.S. Haldane, natural selection, conditions for natural selection, philosophy and history of biology.

 

 

 

Andrzej Gecow
Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warszawa

E-mail: gecow@op.pl

 

FROM HALDANE’S 20TH CENTURY POPULATION GENETICS TO THE TODAY JABLONKA BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION AND HEREDITY CONCEPTION

 

ABSTRACT

Revolution is just going on. Only correct population genetics stops to be the “only correct”. The information just takes the place of genes. Less serious psychological aspects play here role of main factors. Haldane and Jablonka are symbols of consecutive revolution in the biology.
Keywords: recapitulation, epigenetics, biological information, memetics, complex networks.